










































UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
ROBERT MAAG, individually, and on 




U.S. BANK, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
 Case No.:  21-cv-00031-H-LL 
 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION TO DISMISS  
 
[Doc. No. 19.] 
 
On March 9, 2021, Defendant U.S. Bank, National Association filed a motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff Robert Maag’s second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  (Doc. No. 19.)  On March 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a response in 
opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss.  (Doc. No. 23.)  On April 5, 2021, Defendant 
filed a reply.  (Doc. No. 24.)  A hearing on the motion is currently scheduled for Monday, 
April 12, 2021.  (Doc. No. 19.)  The Court, pursuant to its discretion under Civil Local 
































Rule 7.1(d)(1), determines the matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument, 
submits the motion on the parties’ papers, and vacates the hearing.  For the reasons that 
follow, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss.  
Background1 
Defendant, a large national banking association, provides banking services to 
Plaintiff.  (Doc. No. 14 ¶¶ 6, 13.)   During this relationship, Plaintiff entrusted Defendant 
with his personal identifiable information (“PII”).  (Id. ¶ 13.)  For example, Plaintiff 
provided Defendant with his name, account number, and social security number, among 
other things.  (Id. ¶¶ 2, 16.)  Defendant stored Plaintiff’s PII on its servers without 
redacting, encrypting, or otherwise de-identifying the information.  (See id. ¶ 15.)   
On July 30, 2020, a server containing Plaintiff’s PII was physically stolen from one 
of Defendant’s offices.  (Id. ¶ 15.)  In September 2020, Defendant provided written notice 
to Plaintiff that his PII may have been compromised because of this incident.  (Id.)  While 
Plaintiff does not allege that his PII has been misused in any way as a result of the server 
theft, Plaintiff claims he was nonetheless harmed because his privacy was invaded, his PII 
depleted in value, he faces an increased risk of future identity theft, and he was forced to 
spend money on a credit-monitoring service.  (Id. ¶ 6.) 
On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed a second amended class action complaint against 
Defendant, alleging claims under California’s Consumer Privacy Act (the “CCPA”) and 
California’s Unfair Competition Law (the “UCL”).  (Doc. No. 14.)  With the present 
motion, Defendant moves to dismiss both claims under Rule 12(b)(6).  (Doc. No. 19.)   
Discussion 
I. Legal Standards 
 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. 
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint must provide “a short 
 
1  The following allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s second amended complaint unless otherwise 
provided.    
































and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(a)(2), and “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009). A court must assume the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 
337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).  But the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 
couched as a factual allegation.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).   
II. Plaintiff’s UCL Claim 
Defendant moved to dismiss both Plaintiff’s UCL and CCPA claims.  (Doc. No. 19 
at 1-2.)   In his opposition, Plaintiff specifically stated that he does not oppose Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss his UCL claim.  (Doc. No. 23 at 5, 14.)  Accordingly, the Court grants 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the UCL claim with prejudice. 
III. Plaintiff’s CCPA Claim 
Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under the CCPA.  To state a CCPA claim, a 
plaintiff must allege that his or her PII was accessed “as a result of the business’s violation 
of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices 
appropriate to the nature of the information.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150(a)(1).  Here, 
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support the notion that Defendant’s security was 
deficient.  Plaintiff only makes unsupported allegations that his PII was compromised 
because Defendant did not “implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and 
practices,” (Doc. No. 14 ¶¶ 18-19), “failed to effectively monitor its systems for security 
vulnerabilities,” (id. ¶ 4), and had “lax security,” (id. ¶ 20).2  These conclusory allegations 
 
2  Plaintiff does allege that Defendant failed to protect his PII with an encryption or password.  (Doc. 
No. 14 ¶ 22.)  But this allegation goes to a separate element of Plaintiff’s CCPA claim.  See Cal. Civ. 
Code § 1798.150(a)(1).  The CCPA only applies to “nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information” 
in the first place.  Id.  Thus, holding that the failure to password protect PII also amounts to a failure to 
adopt “reasonable security measures” would read the latter element out of the CCPA altogether, and would 
































are alone insufficient to state a CCPA claim.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do 
not suffice.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); Anderson v. Kimpton Hotel & Rest. Grp., 
LLC, 19-CV-01860-MMC, 2019 WL 3753308, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2019) (dismissing 
claim under the California Customer Records Act (the “CCRA”) because the plaintiffs 
“fail[ed] to allege any facts in support of their conclusory allegation that” the defendant 
did not implement reasonable security protocols); Razuki v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., 17-
CV-1718-LAB (WVG), 2018 WL 6018361, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018) (dismissing 
CCRA claim alleging security procedures did not comply with industry standards absent 
factual allegations regarding how procedures were noncompliant).  Accordingly, the Court 
also grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s CCPA claim. 
In his opposition, Plaintiff requested leave to amend his CCPA claim.  (Doc. No. 23 
at 14.)  Defendant opposed this request.  (Doc. No. 24 at 1, 4-5.)  Where a motion to dismiss 
is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless the court determines that the 
allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure 
the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 
1986)).  The Court grants Plaintiff one additional opportunity to attempt to state a CCPA 
claim if he can do so.  Plaintiff is on notice that he must cure the deficiencies as to the 
CCPA claim noted in this Order or face dismissal with prejudice. 
Conclusion 
 For the reasons above, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss.  The Court 
dismisses Plaintiff’s UCL claim with prejudice and dismisses Plaintiff’s CCPA claim with 
 
mean that any theft of unencrypted PII could create CCPA liability.  Courts generally interpret statutes to 
avoid such results.  City of Huntington Beach v. Bd. of Administration, 841 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Cal. 1992) 
(“[L]egislation must be construed as a whole while avoiding an interpretation which renders any of its 
language surplusage.”).  Thus, Plaintiff’s allegation that his PII was not password protected is insufficient 
to state a CCPA claim on its own. 
































limited leave to amend.  Plaintiff must file an amended complaint, if any, to cure the 
deficiencies noted in this Order, within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.3 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: April 8, 2021 
                                                                             
       MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 
       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
3  Plaintiff requested judicial notice of several items mentioned in a complaint in a related case.  (Doc. 
No. 23-1.)  Because the Court did not need to rely on any of these items to resolve the issues presented in 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as moot. 
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